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Abstract 
 
This article aims to review the monetary policy rule under inflation targeting 
framework focusing on Mongolia. The empirical analysis estimates the policy reaction 
function to see if the inflation targeting has been linked with a monetary policy rule 
emphasizing on inflation stabilization since its adoption in 2007. The study contributes 
to the literature by examining the linkage between Mongolian monetary policy rule and 
inflation targeting directly and thoroughly for the first time and also by taking into 
account a recent progress in the inflation targeting framework toward forward-looking 
mode. The main findings were: the Mongolian current monetary policy rule under 
inflation targeting is characterized as inflation-responsive rule with forward-looking 
manner (one quarter ahead); the inflation responsiveness is, however, weak enough to be 
pro-cyclical to inflation pressure; and the rule is also responsive to exchange rate due to 
the “fear of floating”, which weakens the policy reaction to inflation and output gap. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Central Bank of Mongolia (BOM) has adopted “inflation targeting” 1 as its 
monetary policy framework since 2007. The background behind introducing the inflation 
targeting lies in the fact that the correlation between money supply and inflation had 
declined, hence had come the need to reform the monetary policy method in the 2000s. 
The BOM had a monetary aggregate targeting framework until 2007 with reserve money 
as an operating target and with M2 as an intermediate target. Since the 2000s, however, 
the deviation of monetary aggregate from those targets has been enlarged due to a re-
monetization process and a volatility of the money multiplier. The BOM has thus 
introduced the inflation targeting framework since 2007, which contains the policy 
mandate of announcing a targeted inflation rate to the public and of taking every possible 
measures to maintain inflation rate at the targeted rate. At the same time, the BOM has 
adopted one-week central bank bills’ rate as a policy rate since July 2007, so that the 
policy rate can work as an operating target to attain its targeted inflation rate. Since 
introducing the inflation targeting in 2007, the BOM, having experienced the challenges 
of high and volatile inflation, has taken several steps to make the inflation targeting 
system more effective: the BOM has introduced the Forecasting and Policy Analysis 
System (FPAS) since 2011 as a forward-looking framework, and has established an 
interest rate corridor to enhance the policy rate transmission mechanism since 2013 as an 
operational framework. 
The question then arises on how we can evaluate the performance of inflation target 
that has been operated for one decade since its adoption in Mongolia. In general, there 
seems to be a consensus in academic literature and policy discussions that inflation 
targeting has so far been successful to stabilize inflation in advanced economies with the 
history of its operation since the 1990s (e.g. Mishkin and Posen, 1998; Mishkin and 
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007). As far as emerging market economies including Mongolia are 
concerned, however, there has been rather less evidence to support the performance of 
inflation targeting due to the relatively shorter history of its operation and due to some 
difficulties in its management. 
The difficulties that emerging market economies have faced in operating their 
inflation targeting might come from exchange rate fluctuations for the following senses. 
First, inflation targeting can work well only when monetary autonomy is secured under 
floating exchange rate regime with capital mobility. Emerging market economies have, 
                                                             
1 The essence of inflation targeting framework was clearly described in Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) 
and Bernanke et al. (1999), for instance. 
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however, the problem of “fear of floating”, as suggested by Calvo and Reinhart (2002). 
It comes from a lack of confidence in currency value, especially given that their external 
debts are primarily denominated in US dollars. Their efforts to avoid exchange rate 
volatility prevent their monetary authorities from concentrating fully on inflation 
targeting. Second, as Eichengreen (2002) argued, exchange rate fluctuation itself has large 
influence on domestic prices through the “pass-through” effect in small, open economies. 
It makes it difficult for monetary authorities to control inflation and to perform inflation 
targeting well. There is, however, a counterargument against the pass-through effect on 
inflation targeting. Gagnon and Ihrig (2004) argued that an inflation targeting framework 
reduces the pass-through effect, in the sense that domestic agents are less inclined to 
change prices in response to a given exchange rate shock under the strong commitment 
of a monetary authority to price stability. 
Another possible difficulty for inflation targeting management in emerging market 
economies is the lack of credibility of the central bank capacity. It might come from 
arbitrary policy reactions accompanied with unreliable inflation forecasting by central 
banks as well as the economic uncertainty and volatility. As long as agents do not believe 
that a monetary authority will be successful in achieving inflation target, it will be difficult 
for inflation targeting to have any significant impact on expectations and behaviors of 
private sectors with respect to wage and pricing contracts. As Eichengreen (2002) 
emphasized, the lack of credibility would thus lessen inflation targeting performance. 
Some studies, among the limited literature, have assessed inflation targeting in 
emerging market economies as “conditional” success. For example, Mishkin (2000, 2004) 
argued that the success of inflation targeting could not be solely attributed to the actions 
of central banks, and that supportive policies such as the absence of large fiscal deficits 
and rigorous regulation and supervision of financial sector were crucial to its success. Lin 
and Ye (2009) also noted that the performance of inflation targeting could be affected by 
a country’s characteristics such as the government’s fiscal position, the central bank’s 
desire to limit movements of exchange rate and its willingness to meet the preconditions 
of policy adoption. Ito and Hayashi (2004) presented the following two recommendations 
on inflation targeting management, considering the characteristics of emerging market 
economies: 1) emerging market countries should set an inflation with target central rate 
slightly higher and with a target range slightly wider than a typical advanced country; (2) 
small, open economies may pursue both an inflation target range and an implicit basket 
band in exchange rate regime, as both targets are expressed in a range (the targets work 
as the source of stability in expectations, while the ranges allow some flexibility). 
Mongolia is not an exception in facing the aforementioned difficulties and 
4 
 
conditional success in inflation targeting operation as one of emerging market economies. 
This article, in this context, reviews the monetary policy rule under inflation targeting 
framework focusing on Mongolia. To be specific, this study estimates the policy reaction 
function to see if the inflation targeting has been linked with a monetary policy rule 
emphasizing on inflation stabilization since its adoption in 2007. The study samples 
quarterly data from the third quarter of 2007 to the fourth quarter of 2017, and the 
additional estimation divides the sample into the first period from the third quarter of 
2007 to the fourth quarter of 2011 and the second period from the first quarter of 2012 to 
the fourth quarter of 2017, considering the progress made by the BOM on the inflation 
targeting framework.   
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the 
monetary policy framework since the 1990s in Mongolia. Section 3 reviews previous 
studies on monetary policy rules in emerging market economies in Asia and clarifies this 
paper’s contribution. Section 4 conducts the empirical analyses by describing the data, 
the methodology, and the estimation result with its interpretation. Section 4 summarizes 
and concludes. 
 
2. Overview of Monetary Policy Framework in Mongolia 
 
This section first describes the short history of monetary policy framework since the 
1990s in Mongolia, and then observes the performance in Mongolian inflation targeting 
in connection with the policy rate stances since its adoption in 2007.2 
 
2.1 Development of Monetary Policy Framework since the 1990s 
 
The Mongolian economic system shifted from a centrally planned economy to a 
market-based economy in early 1990s, and a great number of political and economic 
reforms were undertaken since then. In 1991, Mongolia approved a new banking law and 
organized the two-tier banking system: the BOM implements monetary policy as a central 
bank, and other banks yields commercial services. Regarding the monetary policy 
framework, it has the following three phases since the 1990s: monetary aggregate 
targeting from 1995 to 2006, transition to inflation targeting from 2007 to 2011, and 
inflation targeting with forward-looking framework from 2011 to the present. 
In the first phase of monetary aggregate targeting for 1995-2006, the BOM set the 
                                                             
2 The description on this section is based on Bayardavaa et al. (2005) and the BOM website: 
https://www.mongolbank.mn/eng/listmonetarypolicy.aspx?id=01. 
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reserve money as an operating target and M2 as an intermediate target, only through the 
policy instruments of operating central bank bill and reserve requirement. Since the mid-
2000s, however, the relationship between reserve money and broad money, namely, the 
money multiplier, became unstable and the impact of money supply on inflation became 
ambiguous due to financial deepening, fiscal dominance and its monetization process. 
Hence came the necessity for the BOM to apply alternative monetary policy framework. 
In the second phase from 2007, the BOM initiated inflation targeting, which contains 
the policy mandate of announcing the targeted inflation rate to the public and of taking 
every possible measures to maintain inflation rate at the targeted rate. At the same time, 
the BOM has adopted one-week central bank bills’ rate as a policy rate since July 2007, 
so that the policy rate can work as an operating target to attain its targeted inflation rate 
through its transmission mechanism.3 Mongolian economy was, however, hit by the wave 
of world financial crisis in 2009, and the BOM adopted the IMF Stand-by program in that 
year in order to safeguard the foreign exchange reserves and to relieve immediate pressure 
on exchange rate. The program’s terms required BOM to target monetary aggregate by 
putting a ceiling on net domestic assets and setting a floor for net foreign assets. In 2011, 
the BOM finally completed 18 month Stand-by program.  
In the third phase from 2011, the BOM has been developing the Forecasting and 
Policy Analysis System (FPAS), for the purpose of upgrading the inflation targeting to a 
forward-looking framework. The system aims at forecast-based policy formation and 
decision making, and effective communication with the public under the inflation 
targeting framework. In this phase, the BOM also have improved its operational 
framework by establishing an interest rate corridor since February 2013. The interest rate 
corridor around the policy rate consists of two standing facilities: the rate of overnight 
repo facility as a ceiling (policy rate plus two percent points) and the rate of overnight 
deposit facility as a floor (policy rate minus two percent points). Setting the corridor is 
expected to contribute to reducing fluctuations in short-term interest rates and to 
improving interest rate channel of monetary transmission mechanism. 
 
2.2 Performance of Inflation Targeting 
 
This section, focusing on the second and third phases above after 2007, observes the 
performance of inflation targeting by comparing the targeted inflation with the actual 
                                                             
3 The BOM still keeps the reserve requirement ratio as a monetary policy instrument as well as the 
policy rate. 
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inflation and by associating the trend in inflation rate with the policy rate stances.4 
Figure 1 compares the actual inflation rate with the targeted rate in terms of annual 
rate at each year-end, in which the targeted inflation rate is updated by the BOM’s 
Monetary Policy Guidelines for each year. Figure 2 illustrates the central bank’s policy 
rate and the interest rate corridor in comparison with the interbank market rate. 
Soon after the adoption of inflation targeting in 2007, Mongolian economy was hit 
by the wave of world financial crisis in 2009, and the BOM adopted the IMF Stand-by 
program in that year. At that time, the main focus of the BOM was to restore the 
confidence in the local currency and to stop the deposit flight out of its economy, and the 
BOM thus raised its policy rate from 9.75 percent to 14 percent in March 2009, although 
the BOM afterwards reduced its policy rate gradually to 10 percent in September 2009 in 
accordance with the declining inflation rate. 
For the period from 2010 to 2013, Mongolian economy entered the booming stage 
with double-digit inflation rate, which was mostly beyond the targeted rate that pursued 
a single-digit level. There were the following reasons behind the fueling inflation: the 
price elevation of food, fuel and public administrative goods in the supply side, the 
expansionary fiscal policy particularly in terms of the cash handout to the public from the 
specific government fund and the sore of capital inflows in the mining sector in the 
demand side. The BOM reacted to the hike of inflation by raising its policy rate 
continuously to 13.25 percent until January 2013. At the same time, the BOM initiated 
the “Medium-term Price Stabilization Program” containing the programs to stabilize food 
and fuel prices in October 2012 to decrease the supply side pressure on inflation. As a 
result of these policies, the inflationary pressure was calming down to some degree, 
thereby the BOM cutting again its policy rate consecutively from January to June in 2013 
toward 10.5 percent. The interest rate corridor was also initiated from February 2013 as 
was stated before. As Figure 2 showed clearly, before the corridor adoption there was 
large deviations between the policy rate and the interbank market rate, but after its 
adoption, those deviations have been settled down within the corridor range. 
For 2014-2015, under the background of the slowdown in the world economy 
including Chinese economy, the net inward foreign direct investment to Mongolia fell 
down sharply (in 2014 by 17 times less than its peak in 2011), thereby the balance of 
payment facing difficulties. To improve external balance, the BOM turned to tight 
monetary policy by raising its policy rate to 12 percent in July 2014 and further to 13 
percent in January 2015. At the end of 2015, the inflation rate fell down to 1.9 percent as 
                                                             
4 The description in this section is based on the annual report of the BOM in each year. 
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year-on-year rate, which was far below the targeted rate.  
After 2016, the BOM eased its monetary policy by cutting its policy rate to 12 percent 
in January 2016 and further to 10.5 in May 2016, considering that the inflation rate 
remained below the targeted rate. The BOM, however, raised its policy rate again to 15 
percent in August 2016, since during July to August the shortage of foreign reserves 
incurred the rapid currency depreciation, which endangered the capital flight. After 
avoiding a currency crisis, the BOM started to reduce its policy rate gradually and 
continuously from December 2016 through 2017. The inflation rates in 2016 and 2017 
were still below the targeted rate at the year-end. 
To sum up, in the early stage of inflation targeting for 2007-2013, the actual inflation 
rate tended to exceed the targeted rate in spite of tight monetary policies due to fiscal and 
supply-side pressures. In the latter stage for 2015-2017, on the contrary, the inflation rate 
has been will-restrained under the targeted rate. The critical issue is that even under such 
a stagnant economic condition for that period, the BOM has still kept its policy rate at 
rather high level, namely, more than ten percent. As the aforementioned story told us, the 
constraint in the BOM monetary policy comes from the difficulty in balance of payment 
caused mainly by the sharp decline in inward foreign direct investment and at the same 
time the difficulty in the fluctuation of local currency value, so-called, “fear of floating”.   
 
3. Literature Review and Contributions 
 
This section reviews previous studies on monetary policy rules under inflation 
targeting in emerging market economies in Asia and clarifies this paper’s contribution. 
On this issue, there are very few empirical studies, because only less than two decades 
have passed since their adoptions of inflation targeting. In fact, East Asian emerging 
market countries initiated inflation targeting after the 1997-1998 Asian currency crisis: 
Korea instituted it in 1998, followed by Indonesia and Thailand in 2000, and the 
Philippines in 2002. Later in these countries, Mongolia started inflation targeting in 2007, 
as mentioned before. Some of these countries have, however, been targeted as a 
quantitative study of inflation targeting: their monetary policy rules have been examined 
by monetary policy reaction functions to see if their rules under inflation targeting have 
really taken inflation-responsive policy stances. Kim and Park (2006) examined the mode 
of operation of inflation targeting by the Bank of Korea through a monetary reaction 
function and found that the Bank adjusted interest rates in response to changes in 
inflationary pressure as well as to output gaps. Siregar and Goo (2008) assessed the 
implementation of inflation targeting in Indonesia and Thailand by employing a Markov-
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switching approach to monetary reaction functions, and showed that controlling 
inflationary expectations has indeed been the focus of monetary policies in these 
economies; but its commitment has only prevailed during stable regimes in Thailand, 
whereas it has prevailed during stable and volatile periods in Indonesia. 
Regarding a choice between interest rate rule and exchange rate rule as monetary 
policy rule, Cavoli (2010) argued that the interest rate rule would be suited for inflation 
targeting, but the exchange rate rule could be an alternative due to “fear of floating” given 
the openness of emerging market economies. The study estimated a simple open 
macroeconomic model to analyze the effectiveness of alternative monetary policy rules 
in East Asian emerging market economies adopting inflation targeting, and found that the 
interest rate rule was more dominant in Korea and Thailand than in Indonesia and the 
Philippines. As for the forward-looking or backward-looking mode of monetary policy 
rule, Taguchi and Kato (2011) examined it focusing on East Asian emerging market 
economies adopting inflation targeting: Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand. 
They found that Korea took an inflation-responsive and forward-looking policy stance 
while Indonesia and Thailand had inflation-responsive but backward-looking stances and 
the Philippines under the de facto pegged currency regime did not follow even inflation-
responsive rule. 
Although there are several studies focusing on individual economies such as Thailand, 
e.g. Lueangwilai (2012), there are no studies of Mongolian monetary policy rule under 
inflation targeting.5  This study’s contribution is thus to examine the linkage between 
Mongolian monetary policy rule and inflation targeting directly and thoroughly by 
applying policy reaction functions for the first time, and further to evaluate a progress in 
the inflation targeting framework toward forward-looking mode by dividing the total 
sample into the first and second periods. The followings are three main research focuses 
on Mongolian policy rule: whether the rule is inflation-responsive and countercyclical to 
inflationary pressure; whether the rule has forward-looking or backward-looking stance; 
and whether the rule contains an exchange rate-responsive reaction due to the “fear of 
floating”. 
 
4. Empirical Analyses 
 
This section conducts the empirical analyses in order to examine the monetary policy 
rule under inflation targeting focusing on Mongolia. For examining it, the study estimates 
                                                             
5 Buyandelger (2015) investigated the relationship between exchange rate pass-through effect and 
monetary policy in Mongolia, but did not examine Mongolian monetary policy rule itself.  
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policy reaction functions to see if the adoption of inflation targeting has been linked with 
an inflation-responsive policy rule. The section first represents sample data and key 
variables for the estimation, followed by the estimation methodology and the estimation 
outcome with its interpretation. 
 
4.1 Sample Data and Key Variables 
 
The analysis here samples the quarterly data running from the third quarter of 2007 
to the fourth quarter of 2017 during which the BOM has operated the inflation targeting. 
The source of all the data used for the estimation is the International Financial Statistics 
(IFS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).6 The analytical indicators are selected 
as follows: “Central Bank Policy Rate” for policy interest rate (denoted by por); 
“Consumer Prices Index (2010=100)” for price index, which is transformed into its year-
on-year change rate as inflation rate for the estimation (π); “Industrial Production, 
Seasonally adjusted, Index (2010=100)” for industrial production, which is further 
processed into production gap (gap) by subtracting from the industrial production a 
Hodrick-Prescott-filter of that series as a proxy of potential production level; and 
“National Currency per US Dollar, Period Average” for exchange rate, which is expressed 
as its year-on-year change rate (exr). The combination between policy interest rate and 
the other variables of inflation rate, production gap and exchange rate, are simply 
displayed in Figure 3. This observation itself does not tell us clear correlations and 
causalities in any combinations since the variables interact each other, and so they should 
be statistically tested in the more sophisticated way in the later section. 
Before conducting the estimation below, the study investigates the stationary 
property of the data for each variable, by employing the Ng-Perron unit root test7 on the 
null hypothesis that each variable has a unit root in the test equation including “trend and 
intercept”. This test constructs four test statistics: modified forms of Phillips and Perron 
(1988) statistics (MZa, MZt), the Bhargava (1986) statistic (MSB), and the Point Optimal 
statistic (MPT). Table 1 reports the test results for the data for all the indicators, i.e., policy 
interest rate (por), inflation rate (π), production gap (gap) and exchange rate (exr) for their 
level data. The test rejected a unit root in all the data at the conventional level of 
significance by more than 95 percent, thereby their data showing stationary property. 
Their data are thus justified to be used for the subsequent estimation. 
                                                             
6 The data are retrieved from the website: http://www.imf.org/en/data.   
7 Ng and Perron (2001) introduced a new unit root test, which used detrended data and a lag selection 
procedure that improved on previous methods. 
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4.2 Methodology: Policy Reaction Function 
 
The policy reaction function is one of the useful analytical tools to describe a 
monetary policy rule in practices managed by a central bank. Its standard specification is 
that a central bank adjusts the nominal policy interest rate in response to the gaps between 
expected inflation and output, and their respective targets. It can be interpreted as a more 
generalized rule of the Taylor rule (see Taylor, 1993) – the simple backward-looking 
policy reaction function. The estimable policy reaction functions were presented for the 
first time by Clarida and Gertler (1997) for the Bundesbank monetary policy, Clarida et 
al. (1998a) for the US monetary policy, and Clarida et al. (1998b) for monetary policies 
of two sets countries: the G3 (Germany, Japan, and the US) and the E3 (UK, France, and 
Italy). Among them, Clarida et al. (1998b) demonstrated the most comprehensive 
estimation of policy reaction functions. For estimating the G3 monetary policy rules, they 
took the forward-looking specification as the baseline and the backward-looking function 
as an alternative for their comparison, and they found that the G3 pursued forward-
looking rules, responding to anticipated inflation as opposed to lagged inflation. As for 
the E3 estimation, they added such explanatory terms as German interest rate and 
exchange rate in their functions, to examine how the constraints of the European 
Monetary System that collapsed in late 1992 influenced the E3 monetary policy rules. 
This study applies the methodology of Clarida et al. (1998b) to estimate the policy 
reaction function for Mongolia during the third quarter of 2007 to the fourth quarter of 
2017. The analysis employs both of forward-looking and backward-looking 
specifications for the estimation, since emerging market economies may face the 
difficulties in forecasting inflation rate as Eichengreen (2002) pointed out. The analysis 
also includes the exchange rate term as one of the monetary policy determinants, since 
emerging market economies may fall into the “fear of floating” as Calvo and Reinhart 
(2002) suggested. 
The original policy reaction function presented by Clarida et al. (1998b) is shown as 
the following equation (1). 
 
𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
∗ = ?̅? + β ∗ (𝐸[𝜋𝑡+𝑛|𝛺𝑡] − 𝜋
∗) + γ ∗ (𝐸[𝑦𝑡|𝛺𝑡] − 𝑦𝑡
∗)   (1) 
 
where 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
∗ is a target for nominal short-term interest rate; ?̅? is the long-run equilibrium 
nominal interest rate; 𝜋𝑡+𝑛 is the inflation rate at the period t+n; 𝑦𝑡 is the real output, 𝜋
∗ 
and 𝑦𝑡
∗ are respective bliss points for inflation and real output; E is the expectation 
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operator; and Ω is the information available to the central bank at the time when it sets 
the interest rate. 
Equation (1) can be rewritten for empirical specification by defining α ≡ ?̅? − 𝛽𝜋∗ 
and 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑡 ≡ 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡
∗, and by replacing the unobserved forecast variables with realized 
variables as follows. 
 
𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
∗ = α + β ∗ 𝜋𝑡+𝑛 + γ ∗ 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡      (2) 
 
where 𝜀𝑡 is a linear combination of the forecast errors of inflation and real output. Then 
the equation (2) is modified in accordance with our analytical concerns into the forward-
looking specification in equation (3) and the backward-looking specification in equation 
(4), and the equation (3) and (4) also include the exchange rate term, exr, as follows. 
 
𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
∗ = α + β ∗ 𝜋𝑡+𝑛 + γ ∗ 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑡 + 𝛿 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 n =1, 2 and 3  (3) 
𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
∗ = α + β ∗ 𝜋𝑡−𝑛 + γ ∗ 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑡 + 𝛿 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 n =0, 1 and 2  (4) 
 
The coefficients of β, γ and 𝛿 are expected to be positive at the significant level.8 
The magnitude of β is also a critical yardstick: if β > 1, it means that the policy rate reacts 
to more than inflation rate, thereby the increase in real policy rate adjusting to stabilize 
inflation in a counter-cyclical way. With β < 1, on the other hand, the decline in the real 
rate still accommodates inflation in a pro-cyclical manner even if a central bank raises 
nominal policy rate. According to Clarida et al. (1998b), the β  magnitudes of the 
Bundesbank, the Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve System in USA are 1.31, 2.04, 
and 1.79, respectively, all of which are more than unity. 
The equation (3) and (4) are further modified for obtaining estimable equations since 
the central bank tends to conduct smooth changes in its policy interest rate in their 
practices. By assuming that the actual rate partially adjusts to the target as 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 =
(1 − 𝜌) ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
∗ + 𝜌 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝜐𝑡 where ρ is the degree of smoothing with 0 < ρ < 1 and 
υ is the disturbance term, equations (3) and (4) can be further rewritten into equation (5) 
and (6) as follows. 
 
𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 = (1 − 𝜌)α + (1 − 𝜌)β ∗ 𝜋𝑡+𝑛 + (1 − 𝜌)γ ∗ 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑡 + (1 − 𝜌)𝛿 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑡 + 𝜌 ∗ 𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡  (5) 
                                                             
8 The coefficient of exchange rate, δ, is expected to be positive. The exchange rate here is expressed 
by national currency per US Dollar, and so the large number represents currency depreciation. In 
that case, the policy rate should be raised to prevent its depreciation following the “fear of float” 
argument. 
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𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 = (1 − 𝜌)α + (1 − 𝜌)β ∗ 𝜋𝑡−𝑛 + (1 − 𝜌)γ ∗ 𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑡 + (1 − 𝜌)𝛿 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑡 + 𝜌 ∗ 𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡  (6) 
 
For the technique to estimate the parameter vector [α, β, γ, δ, ρ], we adopt generalized 
method of moments, since the equations above entail endogeneity problem in that the 
policy interest rate may also affect explanatory variables. The instrumental set includes 
one-, two- and three-quarter lagged values of inflation rate π, production gap gap, and 
exchange rate exr, in the estimation equation (5) and (6). The J-statistic implies that these 
instrumental variables are valid in the sense that the over-identifying restrictions cannot 
be rejected in the models (see Table 2 and 4). 
 
4.3 Estimation Outcome and its Interpretation 
 
Table 2 reports the estimation outcomes of policy reaction functions in two kinds of 
specifications: the forward-looking specification in the equation (5) and the backward-
looking specification in the equation (6). Based on the estimated short-term coefficients 
in the equations of (5) and (6), the long-term coefficients are worked out in the equations 
of (3) and (4), which are displayed in the lower part of each table. 
When we focus on the long-term coefficients, it is only in the case of  𝜋𝑡+1 that the 
coefficient of inflation rate is positive at the significant level of 95 percent as expected 
although the coefficient of production gap is insignificant and that of exchange rate is 
negative, contrary to the expectation; the case of 𝜋𝑡+3 has no significant coefficients; and 
the other cases are excluded in the calculation of the long-term coefficients since the 
degree of smoothing ρ is beyond unity against the expectation. Thus the case of 𝜋𝑡+1 (the 
forward-looking specification with one quarter ahead) could be tentatively a benchmark 
for the total sample from the third quarter of 2007 to the fourth quarter of 2017 when the 
BOM has operated the inflation targeting. 
As was described in Section 2.1, however, the inflation targeting itself has made a 
progress by introducing the FPAS in 2011 as a forward-looking framework. Suppose that 
the FPAS came into effect after 2012, the sample can be divided into the first period from 
the third quarter of 2007 to the fourth quarter of 2011 and the second period from the first 
quarter of 2012 to the fourth quarter of 2017. The sample division could also be justified 
statistically by the Chow’s breakpoint test to diagnose a breakpoint by the statistics with 
probabilities for the hypothesis of parameter stability over different periods. Table 3 
identified the existence of a breakpoint in the first quarter of 2012 in the benchmark case. 
Thus the estimations for the different periods are justified by the breakpoint of the first 
quarter of 2012.  
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Table 4 reports again the estimation outcomes of policy reaction functions for the first 
and second periods on the benchmark case. The first period estimation of policy reaction 
function shows no significant coefficients. In the second period estimation, on the other 
hand, the coefficients of inflation rate and exchange rate are significantly positive whereas 
that of production gap is negative; and the magnitude of inflation coefficient, β, is less 
than unity, 0.444. All in all, among the estimated policy reaction functions, the one of the 
forward-looking specification with one quarter ahead for the second period seems to be 
the best illustration of the current monetary policy rule in Mongolia. 
We interpret the estimation results above as follows. First, the current BOM appears 
to have adopted the inflation-responsive and forward-looking (one quarter ahead) 
monetary policy rule under its inflation targeting framework. It might reflect the progress 
in inflation targeting framework toward forward-looking mode by adopting the FPAS 
since 2011. Second, the current BOM inflation-responsiveness is, however, not powerful 
enough to stabilize inflation in the sense that the real policy rate tends to be still pro-
cyclical to inflation pressure. The Mongolian β magnitude, just 0.444, is in contract to 
those of advanced nations with more than unity that Clarida et al. (1998b) estimated. It 
should also be noted, however, that the policy rate is not the only instrument but often 
supplemented by the reserve requirement ratio in Mongolian monetary policy. Third, the 
Mongolian monetary policy rule is also responsive to exchange rate movement. The 
policy reaction to exchange rate is typically represented by the fact that the BOM has still 
kept its policy rate at more than ten percent even under the inflation rate below the 
targeted rate after 2015 to prevent currency value from falling. This kind of exchange-
rate reaction, so-called “fear of floating”, tends to sacrifice monetary autonomy: the “fear 
of floating” might weaken the policy reaction to inflation and output gap. As a matter of 
fact, the estimation result in this study shows the less-than-unity β magnitude and the 
negative reaction of production gap. 
To sum up, the Mongolian current monetary policy rule under inflation targeting is 
characterized as inflation-responsive rule with forward-looking manner (one quarter 
ahead); the inflation responsiveness is, however, weak enough to be pro-cyclical to 
inflation pressure; and the rule is also responsive to exchange rate due to the “fear of 
floating”, which weakens the policy reaction to inflation and output gap. 
 
4.4 Policy Implications 
 
The purpose of this section is to provide some strategic policy implications to 
improve monetary autonomy in the Mongolian monetary policy. Although emerging 
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market economies cannot avoid the problem of “fear of floating” perfectly, some 
economies are keeping their monetary autonomy by allowing exchange rate fluctuations 
in a similar way to advanced economies. According to Taguchi and Wanasilp (2018), for 
instance, the Thailand policy reaction function is similar to those of advanced nations in 
the sense that the Thailand β magnitude is more than unity just like advanced economies. 
The followings are some possible suggestions for Mongolia economy to enhance its 
monetary autonomy by extracting some lessons from forerunners’ economies.  
First, Mongolian economy should have more foreign reserves to cope with foreign 
capital mobility. There have been several studies to argue that the accumulation of foreign 
reserves has contributed to retaining monetary autonomy. Aizenman et al. (2010) 
provided empirical evidence, for instance, that a higher level of foreign reserves enables 
a country to pursue a higher level of monetary independence even under the constraint of 
impassible trinity. Taguchi (2011) interpreted this contribution of foreign reserves as the 
anchoring role for retaining monetary autonomy in emerging market economies facing 
the “fear of floating.” Looking at the trend in total reserves in months of imports of 
Mongolia in comparison with those of Indonesia, Thailand and lower middle incomers in 
Figure 4, Mongolian foreign reserves are far less than the other economies’ ones so that 
the BOM should sensitively manage its policy rate against foreign capital flights. Hence 
comes the need to accumulate foreign reserves at least to the average level in lower middle 
incomers to improve monetary autonomy in Mongolia. 
Second, from the long-term perspective, Mongolian economy should diversify 
manufacturing industries to maximize the advantage of currency depreciation in export 
side and to minimize its disadvantage in import side. Currency depreciation, as far as it 
does not lead to a crisis, push up exports and, this export recovery can be a growth 
momentum of total economy in case the export activities involve diversified industries in 
an economy. The depreciation is also not so harmful in import side in case an economy 
does not depend too much on imports under domestic production capacities enough in 
diversified industries. Regarding the Mongolian trading items, the exports concentrate on 
mining products and Animal husbandry products, and the imports concentrate on 
machinery and consumption goods. Looking at the trade indices of Mongolia in 
comparison with those of Indonesia, Thailand, developing economies and the world in 
Table 5, the Mongolian trade structure shows the highest concentration on a few products 
by Product Concentration Indices, and the highest diversification from the world average 
structure by Product Diversification Indices.9 The industrial diversification may provide 
                                                             
9 The Product Concentration Indices are measured by a Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index, and the Product 
Diversification Indices measure the absolute deviation of the trade structure of a country from world 
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a resilience against currency depreciation so that the BOM care for “fear of floating” can 
be mitigated and its monetary autonomy can be recovered to some extent.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
This article reviewed the monetary policy rule under inflation targeting framework 
focusing on Mongolia. The empirical analysis estimated the policy reaction function to 
see if the inflation targeting has been linked with a monetary policy rule emphasizing on 
inflation stabilization since its adoption in 2007. The study contributed to the literature 
by examining the linkage between Mongolian monetary policy rule and inflation targeting 
directly and thoroughly for the first time and also by taking into account a recent progress 
in the inflation targeting framework toward forward-looking mode. 
The main findings through the estimation outcomes of policy reaction functions were 
as follows. First, the Mongolian current monetary policy rule under inflation targeting is 
characterized as inflation-responsive rule with forward-looking manner (one quarter 
ahead). It might reflect the progress in inflation targeting framework toward forward-
looking mode by adopting the FPAS since 2011. Second, the inflation-responsiveness is, 
however, not powerful enough to stabilize inflation in the sense that the real policy rate 
tends to be still pro-cyclical to inflation pressure. It would be quite different from the 
monetary policy reactions of advanced economies. Third, the Mongolian monetary policy 
rule is also responsive to exchange rate movement, due to the “fear of floating”. The 
policy reaction to exchange rate is typically represented by the fact that the BOM has still 
kept its policy rate at more than ten percent even under the inflation rate below the 
targeted rate after 2015 to prevent currency value from falling. The “fear of floating” 
might weaken the policy reaction to inflation and output gap. 
The strategic policy implication to enhance monetary autonomy in the Mongolian 
monetary policy would be the serious necessities to have more foreign reserves to cope 
with foreign capital mobility and to diversify manufacturing industries to acquire a 
resilience against currency depreciation in the long run. 
  
                                                             
structure. Both indices are retrieved from UNCTAD Stat and are defined in UNCTAD Handbook of 
Statistics 2016. 
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Figure 1 Actual Inflation and Targeted Inflation 
 
Source: Author’s description based on the website of the Bank of Mongolia 
 
Figure 2 Policy Rate, Corridor Rates and Interbank Market Rate 
 
Source: Author’s description based on the website of the Bank of Mongolia 
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Figure 3 Observation of Analytical Indicators 
 
Source: IFS of IMF 
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Table 1 Unit Root Test 
 
Note: ***, ** denote the rejection of null hypothesis at the 99% and 95% level of significance. 
Sources: IFS of IMF 
 
Table 2 Policy Reaction Functions 
 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote the rejection of null hypothesis at the 99%, 95% and 90% level of significance. 
Sources: IFS of IMF 
  
   MZa    MZt    MSB    MPT
por -42.202 *** -4.560 *** 0.108 *** 2.332 ***
π -26.613 *** -3.647 *** 0.137 *** 3.426 ***
gap -22.719 ** -3.306 ** 0.145 ** 4.389 ** 
exr -24.853 *** -3.487 *** 0.140 *** 3.888 ***
Forward-looking πt+1 πt+2 πt+3
(1-ρ )*α
0.288
(0.129)
-2.687
(-0.996)
0.545
(0.329)
(1-ρ)*β
0.054 **
(2.278)
0.075 **
(2.458)
0.038
(1.312)
(1-ρ)*γ
0.001
(0.100)
-0.005
(-0.228)
0.042
(1.301)
(1-ρ)*δ
-0.023 **
(-2.721)
-0.022 **
(-2.255)
-0.007
(-0.535)
ρ
0.934 ***
(5.065)
1.177 ***
(5.575)
0.930 ***
(7.010)
J-statistics
3.546
(0.616)
2.588
(0.763)
3.846
(0.571)
Long-term Coefficients
α 4.428 - 7.861
β 0.831 ** - 0.560
γ 0.027 - 0.607
δ -0.368 ** - -0.103
Backward-looking πt πt-1 πt-2
(1-ρ )*α
-1.392
(-0.451)
-1.491
(-0.434)
0.669
(0.731)
(1-ρ)*β
0.037
(1.493)
0.019
(0.866)
-0.075 **
(-2.493)
(1-ρ)*γ
0.002
(0.134)
0.006
(0.290)
-0.023
(-0.722)
(1-ρ)*δ
-0.038 **
(-2.442)
-0.025 *
(-1.887)
-0.031 ***
(-4.188)
ρ
1.115 ***
(4.246)
1.109 ***
(3.922)
1.022 ***
(11.414)
J-statistics
2.753
(0.727)
5.788
(0.327)
3.499
(0.623)
Long-term Coefficients
α - - -
β - - -
γ - - -
δ - - -
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Table 3 Chow Breakpoint Test 
 
Sources: IFS of IMF 
 
Table 4 Policy Reaction Functions for First and Second Periods 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote the rejection of null hypothesis at the 99%, 95% and 90% level of significance. 
Sources: IFS of IMF 
 
Table 5 Trade Indices 
 
Sources: UNCTAD Stat 
  
Forward-looking π t+1 2007Q3-2011Q4 2012Q1-2017Q4
(1-ρ )*α
-1.714
(-0.214)
1.026
(0.606)
(1-ρ)*β
0.064
(0.889)
0.096 ***
(4.266)
(1-ρ)*γ
0.011
(0.217)
-0.100 **
(-2.871)
(1-ρ)*δ
0.0025
(0.069)
0.068 ***
(3.773)
ρ
1.119
(1.677)
0.783 ***
(7.132)
J-statistics
0.403
(0.525)
4.923
(0.425)
Long-term Coefficients
α - 4.739
β - 0.444 ***
γ - -0.465 **
δ - 0.317 ***
2016
Economies
Number
of products
Exports Imports
Number
of products
Exports Imports
Mongolia 110 0.401 0.137 214 0.842 0.449
Indonesia 245 0.128 0.065 254 0.549 0.065
Thailand 251 0.073 0.083 255 0.361 0.266
Developing Economies in Asia 260 0.099 0.108 260 0.241 0.202
Developing Economies 260 0.089 0.089 260 0.197 0.159
World 260 0.062 0.065 260 0.000 0.000
Product Concentration Indices Product Diversification Indices
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Figure 4 Total reserves in months of imports 
 
Source: World Bank Open Data 
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